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FEDERAL INCOME AND GIFT TAXATION OF
MARITAL PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
THE INCOME and gift taxation of property agreements entered into
in contemplation of marriage or divorce' must be ranked high on the
list of federal tax inequities. Yet, this is not an area where it can be
said that hard cases have made bad law. For in the really critical de-
cisions, the courts were in a position to reach the most logical and prac-
tical result; they were neither restricted by precedent or rigid statutory
language nor blinded by glaring economic realities. Although most of
the pieces were fitted into this particular puzzle more than a decade
ago, perhaps it is not too late to protest against their aggregate pattern.
It should be noted in considering the cases which make up this body of
the law that most of the inequities spring from the refusal of the courts
to accept the gift tax definition of "gift" when dealing with the income
tax.
In Commissioner v. Mesta,2 decided in 1941, the husband had trans-
ferred stock greatly appreciated over its cost basis to his wife just before
their divorce in consideration of her relinquishment of aU claims for
maintenance and support. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency in
the husband's income tax on the theory that the difference between the
basis of the stock in his hands and its fair market value at the time of
the transfer was a taxable capital gain. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit curtly rejected the contention that a gift was involved8
and accepted the Commissioner's theory, relying heavily on the Su-
preme Court's language in Helvering v. Horst:4
The decisions and regulations have consistently recognized that receipt in
cash or property is not the only characteristic of realization of income to a
taxpayer. . . .Where the taxpayer does not receive payment of income in
money or property realization may occur when the last step is taken by which
' For recent discussions of the broader tax problems attending separation and divorce,
see Rosenfield, Tax Problems from Marital Difficulties, 5 PRac. LAW. 63 (1959);
Scharfy, Tax Problems Relating to Separation and Divorce, io W. Ras. L. REv. 2oo
(-959).
2 123 F.zd 986 (3 d Cir. x941), cert. denied, 36 U.S. 695 reh. denied, 317 U.S.
704. (1942), 9 U. CHI. L. REv.'525.
"'Obviously the transfer was not a gift .... Nor can it be treated as a division
of property." 123 F.zd 986, 988.
' Ibid.
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he obtains the fruition of the economic gain which has already accrued to
him.
The court denied that there was no way in which to measure the
amount of income realized by Mesta from the transfer of the stock,
holding that the value of the wife's rights would be presumed to be
equal to the fair market value of the property transferred:5
... the amount of the taxpayer's obligation to his wife was fixed in part in
terms of stock by the parties themselves who really dealt at arm's length with
one another.... We think that we may make the practical assumption that
a man who spends money or gives property of a fixed value for an unliqui-
dated claim is getting his money's worth.
Then, in 1945, the Supreme Court, in Merrill v. Fahs,6 considered
whether the transfer of property pursuant to an antenuptial agreement
in exchange for the prospective bride's relinquishment of all marital
rights in the transferor's estate was subject to the gift tax. Although
the gift tax is silent oR this specific point, a provision of the estate tax
stipulates that a release of dower or curtesy or other marital rights in
the transferor's estate is not adequate and full consideration to any ex-
tent. In a perfectly logical decision which has since been criticized with
zeal," the Court held that the estate and gift taxes should be construed
in pari materia in this respect. Accordingly, a gift tax was assessed on
the property transferred.
The stage was set when, in 1947, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit decided Farid-es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner.9 In this
case, the narrow question before the court was whether the taxable
income realized upon the sale of stock earlier acquired pursuant to an
antenuptial agreement should be measured by reference to the substi-
tuted basis of the transferor, as in a gift, or the fair market value of the
stock at the time of transfer, as in a taxable sale or exchange. Thus, the
broader, pivotal question was whether the relinquishment of dower and
other marital rights in the estate of the transferor can constitute con-
lbid.
8 324 U.S. 308 (1945), 19 TEMP. L.Q. 513 (1946). See also 36 MINN. L. Ray.
9x8 (1952).
'INT. Ray. CODE Op 1954 § 2o 4 3 (b) : "For purposes of this chapter, a relinquish-
ment or promised relinquishment of dower or curtesy, or of a statutory estate created in
lieu of dower or curtesy, or of other marital rights in the decedent's property or estate,
shall not be considered to any extent a consideration 'in money or money's worth.'"
S See Rand, What Is a Gift?, 34 Ky. L.J. 99 (1946).
"16e F.±d 81z (2d Cir. 1947). 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1073; 6o HAiv. L. REv. 986;
21 So. CALIF. L. REV. 116; 22 TUL. L. REV. 344.
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sideration for income tax purposes. Since the stock had greatly appre-
ciated in value over the transferor's basis when it was acquired by the
taxpayer, she was naturally anxious that the transaction in which she
received it be deemed to represent a bona fide exchange for income tax
purposes.
The court found in the taxpayer's favor. Thus, although the income
tax nowhere defines "gift," the statutory "adequate and full considera-
tion" test applicable under the estate and gift taxes was rejected in
favor of an essentially common law test of consideration."0 Merrill v.
Fahs was quickly dismissed: 1
We find in this decision no indication, however, that the term "gift" as
used in the income tax statute should be construed to include a transfer which,
if made when the gift tax were effective, would be taxable to the transferor
as a gift merely because of the special provisions in the gift tax statute de-
fining and restricting consideration for gift tax purposes.
Meanwhile, cases such as Commissioner v. Maresi2 and Commis-
sioner v. Converse 3 had established that no gift is made when marital
rights are exchanged for property in a postnuptial arrangement con-
tingent for its efficacy upon approval by the divorce court. The theory
was that since, without the decree, there would be no enforceable rights
and obligations, the transfer was not made pursuant to a "promise or
agreement" in the statutory sense.'4  /
A further refinement was added in 195o by Harris v. Commis-
sioner.5 There, the Supreme Court held that no gift was involved in
'Old. at 815: "[Petitioner's] inchoate interest in the property of her affianced hus-
band greatly exceeded the value of the stock transferred to her. It was a fair considera-
tion under ordinary legal concepts of that term for the transfers of the stock by him."
The decision also raised donative intent as an element of a gift for purposes of the
income tax: "Though such a consideration as this petitioner gave for the shares of stock
she acquired from Mr. Kresge might not have relieved him from liability for a gift
tax,... it was nevertheless a fair consideration which prevented her taking the shares
as a gift under the income tax law since it precluded the existence of a donative intent."
Ibid.
'14 at 814
"2 z56 F.d 929 (2d Cir. 1946).
z63 F.zd z3z (2d Cir. z947).
-The requirement that the claim against the transferor be based, upon a "promise
or agreement" stems from-the fact that this language was included in INT. RLy. COmE
OF 1939 § 8z2(b), which was incorporated into the gift tax in Merrill v. Faks. See
Irx. Ray. Con, oF 1954 § 205i(c).
13 340 U.S. io6 (195o). See Pedrick., The Gift TaV Jurisdiction of the Divorce
Court, 46 ILL.. .REV. 177 (195i) ; ,Coiiment4 3 Dura B.J. i (1952), for discussion
of the significance of this case. I.
[Vol. 19s9:6x6
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a postnuptial property settlement even though the provisions thereof
were, if divorce in fact ensued, to outlive the provisions of the divorce
decree. The Court reasoned, in effect, that since the gift tax is levied
upon the transfer" of property, there should be no gift tax where the
transfer is "effected by court decree,"' 7 since the decree would not, in
a realistic sense, constitute a "promise or agreement" between the parties
thereto.
Finally, section 2516, written into the 1954 Code, 8 provides that
for purposes of the gift tax any transfer of property in settlement
of marital rights which is incorporated into a written agreement fol-
lowed by divorce within two years shall be deemed to be made for a
full and adequate consideration.
The product of these developments is this: Where property is trans-
ferred for relinquishment of prospective marital rights in the trans-
feror's estate pursuant to an antenuptial agreement, a gift tax liability
is incurred under the Merrill rule. And, since this transfer is a sale or
* exchange for the wife under the rule of Farid-es-Sultanek, it must also
be a taxable event for the husband " for income tax purposes. Similarly,
a transfer of property for relinquishment of marital rights, other than
support,20 pursuant to a postnuptial agreement which does not fall
"a See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 2501(a).
27 340 U.S. o6, iii.
1 "Where husband and wife enter into a written agreement relative to their marital
and property rights and divorce occurs within 2 years thereafter (whether or not such
agreement is approved by the divorce decree), any transfers of property or interests in
property made pursuant to such agreement-
(i) to either spouse in settlement of his or her marital or property rights, or
(2) to provide a reasonable allowance for the support of issue of the marriage
during minority, shall be deemed to be transfers made for a full and adequate considera-
tion in the money or money's worth."
Note that transfers to adult children, or to minor children, in excess of their needs
for reasonable support are subject to the gift tax, whether or not they are made pur-
suant to divorce decree. Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.zd 505 (2d Cir. 1953);
Karl T. Wiedemann, 26 T.C. 565 (1956).
" The Fard-es-ultaneh case, of course, did not consider the husband's income tax
liability at all. Moreover, the Mesta case involved a postnuptial transfer. No case has
.been found wherein it was directly held that a transferor of property in an antenuptial
settlement incurs an income tax liability. This seems, however, a logical inference to
be drawn from the reasoning employed in both the FarU-es-Sultazeh and Mesta de-
cisions.
'
0 E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cums. BuLL. 166, specifically provides that the right of a di-
vorced wife to support from a former husband during their joint lives shall not be con-
sidered an element of her marital rights in his property or estate for purposes of the gift
tax. In ruling that a wife's right of support may constitute consideration for purposes
of the estate and gift taxes, the Service relinquished the victory which it had won when
Vol. 1959: 6i6]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
within the purview of the Harris case or section 2516, attracts a gift
tax. Commissioner v. Mesta and its progeny establish that a postnuptial
settlement is not a gift for purposes of the income tax.21 Thus, in
either an antenuptial or a postnuptial property settlement, even as a gift
tax is imposed on the theory that the transfer was not for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth, an income tax may'
be incurred by the husband on the theory that the transfer was not a
gift. Moreover, if either type of transfer is a taxable event under the
income tax for one spouse, it must logically have the same significance
for the other. That is, as to the wife, all logic would indicate that she
realizes a gain to the extent that the value of what she receives exceeds
her basis in the rights which she gives up.
It is no doubt true that the typical postnuptial property settlement
represents a compromise of adverse interests at the conclusion of arm's
length negotiations. And antenuptial settlements are often executed,
after some hard bargaining, on the initiative of a man of some wealth
who has had bitter experience upon the dissolution of a previous mar-
riage. To this extent, these arrangements do resemble a taxable ex-
change little motivated by benevolent feelings. But this characteriza-
tion is not entirely accurate. The transaction does not produce any
"new" income. What occurs is either a voluntary or involuntary re-
allocation of capital within the family.
Moreover, the dilemma created by Farid-es-Sultaneh and related
cases was in no wise inevitable22 since the income tax statute nowhere
defines "gift." It would not seem that the purposes of that statute
would be frustrated if these transfers were deemed immune from in-
come taxation. That is, taxation of the gain would merely be post-
poned if the transferee took a substituted basis. On the other hand,
since the marital rights of a wife in her husband's estate are specifically
included in his gross estate for purposes of the estate tax, the estate tax
scheme could be subverted to a marked extent if an inter vivos transfer
releasing those rights were permitted to escape the gift tax.2e
the Second Circuit held that support rights were marital rights in a spouse's estate,
which did not constitute consideration for transfer tax purposes. See Meyer's Estate v.
Helvering, 110 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 651 (1940).
2 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (zd Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 741 (1943); Commissioner v. Patino, 13 T.C. 8x6 (1949)
, 
aff'd, z86 F.zd
962 ( 4th Cir. 195o); Edna W. Gardner Trust, 2o T.C. 885 (1953).
' See Pedrick, op. cit. supra 'note 1 S, at 195.
"See LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 740, 741
(1956).
But see note 32 infra.
[Vol. x959: 6x6
PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
To the extent to which it is possible without straining the statutory
language, it seems desirable to correlate the provisions of the federal
income, estate, and gift taxes. And if it can be assumed that only one
tax should be levied upon marital settlements, it would seem that it
logically should be the gift tax. That is, it is suggested that the mean-
ing of "gift" be equated in all three taxes by applying the statutory
adequate and full consideration test to cases involving either antenuptial
or postnuptial property settlements.
It may seem difficult to accept a definition of "gift" which does not
turn upon donative intent. Yet, when working in a field such as taxa-
tion, no apology need be made for adopting that standard which will
produce the most equitable result in tax matters, regardless of the
ensuing damage to concepts imported from the common law.24 It is
submitted that uniform application of the statutory definition in these
cases would produce a benefit going beyond mere symmetry.
Possibly the greatest benefit to be realized from a uniform applica-
tion of this test would be the elimination of what is at least a tax trap
and, perhaps, an invitation to tax evasion. Although the cases dearly
demonstrate the husband's double tax liability in antenuptial and certain
postnuptial transfers, it seems highly likely that such transfers are not
generally recognized by taxpayers as taxable events under the income
tax.25 Moreover, no case has been found in which the question of the
wife's income tax liability has even been considered.
In addition, application of the statutory definition for income tax
purposes would eliminate a highly complicated and confused valuation
problem. Treatment of the relinquishment of marital rights as a tax-
able event under the income tax requires not only the immediate valua-
tion of the property transferred and of the rights relinquished but also
the assignment of a basis to the forfeited rights. That is, the husband's
gain is measured by the difference between his basis in the property
transferred and the fair iarket value of the rights in his estate which
are forfeited. The wife, on the other hand, presumably realizes a gain
measured by the difference between her basis for the forfeited rights
and the fair market value of the property which she receives therefor.
As a practical shortcut, the cases evidently assume that the marital
rights are equal in value to the property transferred. 6 Even so, it will
2, See Dunn v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 861, 86z (E.D. Pa. 1949).
25 Rosenfield, op. cit. supra note i, at 72-
' Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.zd 642 (2d Cir. 942), cert. denied, 39 U.S.
741 (1943) 5 Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 ( 3 d Cir. x94i), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 695, reh. denied, 37 U.S. 704 (942).
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not always be an easy matter to establish the value of this property.
And, as to the wife, what is her basis in the actual or prospective marital
rights? There is no apparent logic in assuming, as may in fact be the
practice, that her basis is equal to the fair market value of the property
which she receives, although this assumption would avoid a tax on the
wife. Rather, it could be argued that the wife's basis is her cost-
zero.2 7  Then, if no income tax is assessed upon the wife at the transfer
of property in relinquishment of her marital rights, it might be main-
tained that her basis in that property should be zero and that her entire
receipts upon subsequent re-sale should be taxed.2
The most perplexing aspects of this valuation miasma would, on the
other hand, be avoided in most cases if the statutory full and ade-
quate test of consideration were employed. This test would more likely
impel the conclusion that the transfer was a gift, in which case it would
be necessary to value only the transferred property in order to establish
the gift tax liability. Basis would be a consideration only in that the
wife would take the substituted basis of the husband in the property
transferred. Gain would be realized only by the wife, and then only
upon subsequent re-sale of the property, when its value would be
dearly established.Of course, under this scheme, the income tax burden, if any, would
be borne entirely by the wife. This effect could be offset by the horse-
trading which characterizes the usual marital settlement. But even if
this possibility did not exist, there seems a certain equity in requiring the
wife to share the onus of the tax upon her husband's estate to the same
extent, practically speaking, as would have obtained had his entire
property been sold during the marriage. Moreover, it seems worthy
of some consideration that the income tax would be levied at a time
when the transfer yielded cash with which to discharge that liability.
Occasional decisions give hope that the current'inequites and inade-
quacies in the taxation of marital property settlements will be corrected
2 It might be argued that the transfers to the wife in return for the relinquishment
of her marital rights represent damages for injuries to interests of personality which are
iot taxable as income to her. See Hawkins v. Com'r, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927); Sol. Op.
r32, x-xC.B. 92 (1922). See also Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (x9x), where in the
absence of an explicit statutory provision to the contrary, the Supreme Court held that
alimony was not taxable as income to a divorced wife..
23 If the wife failed to report the fair market value of the property transferred to
her as income, she may be "estopped" to assert that the basis of the property is its fair
market value upon a subsequent sale. See Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 177 F.2d 508
(zoth Cir. 1949)
, 
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 931 (956') ; Artds C .Bryan, 16 T.C. 792
(1951). Cf., however,, Bennett v. Helvering 137 F.2d 537 (2d Cir..1943).
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by judicial process. For example, the Tax Court recently held in Ina
Mae Marshmant that stock transferred by a divorced husband to his
former wife in exchange for her promise to re-marry him was acquired
by her by gift rather than by purchase. Thus, for capital gains purposes
upon subsequent sale, the stock was assigned a substituted basis rather
than a higher basis of its fair market value at the time of transfer to
the wife.30
Yet, it would seem that ameliorative legislation is in order. If it
were provided by statute, however, that, for the purposes of all three
taxes, the release of dower or curtesy or other marital rights in the
transferor's estate shall not constitute adequate and full consideration
to any extent, then postnuptial transfers within the purview of section
2516 or the Harris case would escape any tax. It is further suggested
that the distinctions therein drawn be abrogated and that all postnuptial
property settlements be exempted from the gift tax1 in reliance, if need
be, upon the theory that such a provision would embody the favor
accorded a transfer of the identical interests upon dissolution of a mar-
riage which has survived until the death of one spouse through the
estate tax marital deduction32
3 T.C. 269 (1948).
"Unfortunately, the Tax Court felt it necessary to distinguish the Farid-es-Sultaneh
case on its facts. That is, in the Farid-es-Sultaneh case, the taxpayer had released all
marital rights in her prospective husband's estate. On the other hand, in the Marshman
case, petitioner gave up no marital rights. Rather, "her right to alimony, as such, was
extinguished as a necessary incident of the remarriage but the right to support which
the alimony represented was continued by the new status." Id. at 271, 272.
"3 There seems little sense in according certain transfers preferential treatment merely
because some lawyer had the foresight to exploit the distinctions embodied in § z5s6
or the Harris case. These are, after all, distinctions based on mere form. See Com-
ment, 3 DUKE B.J. 1, 9 (i95z).
" "In light of the auxiliary role of the gift tax there is surely little reason now for
imposing any tax on the acceleration of the wife's inheritance by divorce when that in-
heritance would pass tax free at death in the absence of divorce. The failure to provide
some sort of divorce marital deduction to parallel the non-taxability of the division of
the community property on divorce can only be explained by legislative oversight."
Pedrick, op. cit. supra note 15, at i95-96.
Vol. z959: 6x6]
